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RULE 11 AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYERS 
COMMENTS OF RATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION 
In response to the Call for Comments 
Issued by the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules 
Judicial Conference of the United States 
November 1, 1990 
INTRODUCTION 
The National Bar Association (tlNBA tI ), by its attorneys, 
hereby submits Comments on Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 ("Rule 11") in 
response to the Call for Comments issued by the Advisory 
Committee on the Civil Rules, Judicial Conference of the United 
States (dated August, 1990). In the Call for Comments, the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules requests comments on various 
aspects of Rule 11. See, 901 F.2d CLXVII (AUgUst 1, 1990). 
The National Bar Association was founded in 1925, and is an 
o~ganization comprised of African-American attorneys throughout 
the United States. Since its founding, the NBA has been involved 
in promoting civil rights activities in an effort to improve the 
educational, societal, and economic welfare of African-Americans 
and other minorities and has long been interested in the effect 
that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure might have on limiting 
access to the courts and the impact on sole practitioners and 
small law firms. In its Call for Comments, the Advisory 
Committee outlines ten (10) inquiries on issues of particular 
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importance. In that vein, the Comments of the NBA addresses 
specifically Inquiry #4, which requests discussion and 
suggestions on the impact of Rule 11 sanctions on civil rights 
plaintiffs and lawyers. l 
The NBA recognizes that the broad discretion afforded 
district court judges in determining the appropriate Rule 11 
sanction was intended as a Itsafety value lt to reduce the pressure 
of mandatory sanctions that shall be imposed after a finding of a 
Rule 11 violation. To that extent, the NBA proposes that the 
basic principle governing sanctions imposed in civil rights 
cases, be the least severe sanction adequate to serve the purpose 
of the rule. NBA submits that to meet the deterrent purpose of 
Rule 11, the district court judge should consider a wide range of 
possible nonmonetary sanctions, coupled witn the consideration of 
a host of mitigating factors, before resorting to monetary 
sanctions. 
NBA asserts that the abuse of discretion standard should be 
applied in reviewing a finding of a Rule 11 violation. The 
choice of sanction, however, should be reviewed under a 
heightened level of scrutiny in civil rights cases to ensure that 
sanctions do not chill the advocacy of the civil rights lawyer. 
lInquiry #4 states as follows: Is there evidence that the 
sanctions rules have been administered unfairly to any particular 
group of lawyers or parties? Particular concern has been 
expressed about the effect on civil rights plaintiffs. Bearing 
in mind that some categories of cases are extremely unlikely to 
result in sanctionable conduct • • • it cannot be expected that 
sanctions will be equally distributed among all categories of 
federal civil litigation. Data may be subject to conflicting 
interpretation. If this is a problem, could an amendment of the 
Rules alleviate or eliminate it? Id. at CLXXVI. 
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See Blue v. U.S. Department of the Army, Nos. 88-1364, et seq., 
at 33 (Slip Op.) (4th Cir., .September 18, 1990). Of course, 
critics would argue why should such a dichotomy of standard of 
review be applied in Rule 11 cases involving civil rights. Those 
critics need only revisit the long line of U.S. Supreme Court 
cases that have helped shape the fabric of today's society to 
realize that society as a whole benefits when lawyers undertake 
to represent cash-trapped clients seeking to vindicate a 
constitutional right when those same attorneys are forsaking the 
prestige and money associated with representing clients with deep 
pockets. Common sense and the almighty dollar tilt the balance 
of the scales of justice in favor of the practice where money and 
. prestige weighs heavily against altruistic rewards and the common 
man. A natural consequence of such circumstance creates a 
disadvantage for the common man whose lawyer may fall under the 
sanctions imposed by Rule 11, while industry, unlike the common 
man, will simply be able to hire another lawyer. A chilling 
thought. 
This Comment addresses the history, function and the 
application of Rule 11 in civil rights cases. In addition, the 
Comment examines the application of Rule 11 in a recent civil 
rights case to illustrate how the indiscriminate application of 





Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 is intended to deter 
abuse of the legal process by allowing courts to sanction 
attorneys who file frivolous pleadings and papers. Apparently 
the original rule as initially promulgated was not effective in 
deterring abuses,2 thus the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 was 
intended to ttreduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions 
. . • by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and 
enforcing those obligations by the imposition of sanctions." 
Amended Rule 11 Advisory Committee Notes. The full text of Rule 
11 reads as follows: 
Every pleading, motion and other paper 
of a party represented by an attorney shall 
be signed by at least one attorney of record 
in the attorney's ind~vidual name, whose 
address shall be stated. A party who is not 
represented by an attorney shall sign the 
party's pleading, motion, or other paper and 
state the party's address. Except when 
otherwise specifically provided by rule or 
statute, pleadings need not be verified or 
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity 
that the averments of an answer under oath 
must be overcome by the testimony of two 
witnesses or of one witness sustained by 
corroborating circumstances is abolished. 
The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate by the signer that 
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or 
other paper; that to the best of the signer's 
knowledge, infor.mation and belief formed 
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded 
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, 
2The Advisory Comments to amended Rule 11 show that the 
amendment's primary purpose was for deterrence of dilatory or 
abusive pretrial tactics and the streamlining of litigation. See 
Advisory Comments. See also Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. 
Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th eire 1986). 
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modification, or reversal of existing law, 
and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, .such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, 
motion or other paper is not signed, it shall 
be stricken unless it is signed promptly 
after the omission is called to the attention 
of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, 
motion or other paper is signed in violation 
of this rule, the court upon motion or upon 
its own initiative, shall impose upon the 
person who found it a represented party, or 
both an appropriate sanction which may 
include an order to pay to the other party or 
parties the amount of the reasonable 
expenses, incurred because of the filing of 
the pleading, motion, or other paper, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
As called for by Rule 11, an attorney signing any pleading, 
motion or other paper in federal court warrants that the pleading 
is well grounded in fact, that it is warranted by existing law, 
or a good faith argument for modification or reversal of existing 
law, and that it is not filed for an improper purpose. See 
Eastway Construction Corporation v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 
243, 254 n.7 (2nd Cir. 1985) ("Eastway III). The amended rule was 
"designed to create an affirmative duty of investigation both as 
to law and as to fact before motions are filed," and it creates 
an objective "standard of reasonableness under the 
circumstances." Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 
(1983); Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 
F.2d at 1536. This expanded application of Rule 11 sanctions 
gave rise to concerns that the Rule might chill creativity in 
advocacy, and ~pede on the traditional ability of the common law 
to adjust to changing situations. In response to this concern, 
the Advisory Committee noted the following: 
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[T]he rule is not intended to chill an 
attorney's enthusiasm, or creativity in 
pursuing factual or legal theories. The 
court is expected to avoid using the wisdom 
of hindsight and should test the signer's 
conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to 
believe at the time the pleading, motion or 
other paper was submitted. 
Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. at 199. See also, In re 
Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 991 (6th Cir. 1987). The National Bar 
believes that this philosophy is sound and should be applied in 
all cases filed including civil rights cases. 
II. OPERATION OF Rule 11 
Rule 11 applies to the filing of "pleadings, motions, and 
other paper" in a civil action and the rule requires that such a 
paper be signed. The purpose of the signature is to attach 
responsibility upon a specific person for those matters that are 
the subject of the certificate. The certificate is meant to 
address two issues: the problem of frivolous filings and the 
problem of misusing judicial procedures as a weapon for personal 
or economic harassment. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 
F.2d 823, 830 (9th eire 1986). 
The Advisory Committee has stated that sanctions should be 
imposed on a party where appropriate under the circumstances and 
the allocation of sanctions among attorneys and their clients was 
a matter of judicial "discretion." See Advisory Committee's Note 
to 1983 amendment; cf. Browning Debenture Holders Committee v. 
DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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Attorneys, law firms and clients have all been subject to 
Rule 11 sanctions. See,~, Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79 (4th 
Cir. 1985) (attorney sanctioned); Calloway v. Marvel 
Entertainment Group, 650 F.Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (attorney 
and law firm sanctioned); Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 
a08 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1987) (attorney and client sanctioned); 
Chevron, U.S.A. v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1985) (client 
sanctioned). By category, a 1985 survey of one-hundred (100) 
Rule 11 cases found that attorneys were sanctioned in 38% of the 
cases; clients in 20%; and both in 18%. See Nelken, Sanctions 
Under Amended Federal Rule 11 -- Some "Chilling" Problems in the 
Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 Geo.L.J. 1313, 
1329 (1986). 
With respect to attorneys, a court may· consider the fact 
that an attorney has vast experience in litigation involving 
political discrimination and thus should know when certain claims 
are groundless. Quiros v. Hernandez Colon, 800 F.2d 1, 2 (1st 
Cir. 1986) (Rule 11 award here serves to sanction and deter 
filing of meritless claims and to compensate those forced"to 
defend them; Due Process claims were groundless). 
The attorney may also be jointly and severally liable for a 
Rule 11 judgment against the client, in large part because the 
attorney has the principal responsibility for complying with the 
rule. A fortiori, as long as the attorney has not been mislead 
by the client, then it is the attorney's conduct that is the 
proximate cause of the Rule 11 violation. Calloway v. Marvel 
Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1477 (2nd Cir. 1988) (court 
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has power to impose joint and several liability on portion of 
sanctions resulting from pa~ty's misconduct where attorney should 
have known that the misconduct violated Rule 11). The reason 
behind holding the attorney liable, and not the client, is 
because of professional responsibility, the attorney is held to 
know of the wrongfulness of the conduct and because of 
professional responsibility should act to prevent it. Id. at 
1474. 
The fact that the court can sanction only the attorney and 
not the client leaves the court with the flexibility in the 
myriad of situations in which attorneys fees or other sanctions 
may be assessed. Quiros v. Hernandez Colon, 800 F.2d at 2 (court 
. presided over the proceedings and is uniquely qualified to 
perform the balancing of equities that is an integral part of the 
proceedings for award of attorney fees). 
It is unclear in at least the Second Judicial Circuit as to 
whether a client may be jointly and severally liable for that 
portion of sanctions resulting from the lawyer's misconduct. Id. 
Sanctions, however, against the client is appropriate when a 
client either knowingly authorized or participated in the filing 
of a paper that violated Rule 11. Calloway v. Marvel 
Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d at 1474-75. Sanctions on the party 
alone are also appropriate when a client misleads an attorney as 
to facts or the purpose of a lawsuit, if the attorney 
nevertheless had an objectively reasonable basis to sign the 
papers in question. See Friedqood v. Axelrod, 593 F.Supp. 395 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (plaintiff lied to attorney). 
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III. THE DISCRETIONARY SANCTION TOOL POR THE COURT 
It is within the discretion of the district court judge to 
find that a Rule 11 violation has occurred. Once the court finds 
that a Rule 11 violation has occurred, the judge must award 
sanctions. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 ("If a pleading, motion or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon a 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose • . . an 
appropriate sanction"); ~ also westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 
F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (tI(T]he new provision mandates 
the imposition of sanctions when warranted by groundless or 
abusive practice"). The court, however, has the discretion to 
decide what type of sanction to award. See,~, Fed.R.Civ.P. 
11 Advisory Committee's Note (the court "has discretion to tailor 
sanctions to the particular facts of the case"); Eastway I, 762 
F.2d at 254 n.7. ("district courts retain broad discretion in 
fashioning sanctions • • • u ) . . Rule 11 only requires that 
sanctions be appropriate. See~, In re Yaqman, 796 F.2d 1165, 
1184-85, opinion amended, 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 108 S.Ct. 450 (1987). 
The uconcept of discretion implies that a decision is lawful 
at any point within the outer limits of the range of choices 
appropriate to the issue at hand; at the same time, a decision is 
outside of those limits, exceeds, or as it is infelicitously 
said, uabuses" allowable discretion. It See Eastway Const. Corp. 
v~ City of New York, 821 F. 2d 121, 123 (2nd Cir. 1987). (tiEastway 
lIn); cf. Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGrow, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 
(2nd eire 1987) (defining abuse of discretion). 
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A. THE DISCRETION IN CHOOSING THE 
TYPE OP APPROPR~E SANCTION 
The broad discretion afforded district courts is reflected 
in the numerous types of sanctions that may be imposed under Rule 
11. To this extent, the Advisory Committee mentions the district 
court's consideration of the status of a litigant as represented 
or pro se; the state of mind of an attorney when the paper was 
signed; the length of time an attorney has to investigate a claim 
or defense; and whether the sanction should be imposed on the 
attorney personally, the client, or both. 
There is, however, a natural tendency to impose sanctions 
that include attorney's fees and reasonable costs provided by the 
rule. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 877 
(5th eire 1988). Financial penalties have been "qharacterized as 
perhaps the most effective way to deter a powerful and wealthy 
party from bringing frivolous or vexatious litigation; or from 
maintaining a baseless position in defense of another party's 
claim. It Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 
1987). The monetary sanctions awarded in the estimated 600 to 
over 1000 Rule 11 decisions appearing in the last six years have 
reached amounts as high as $400,000. See Note, Insuring Rule 11 
Sanctions, 88 Mich.L.Rev. 344 n.2 & 3. One survey indicated that 
the average Rule 11 sanction is $44,118 and the median sanction 
is $5,135. Id. at 345 (citing T. willging, The Rule 11 
Sanctioning Process, 30, 80 (1988). Moreover, some courts impose 
monetary sanctions that bear no relation to the expenses and 
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attorney fees of the opposing party. See Note, Insuring Rule 11 
Sanctions, 88 Mich.L.Rev. at 353 n.62 (1988) (citations omitted). 
The history of the rule supports the argument that the 
tlrulemakers inserted the discretionary language in Rule 11 in 
response to concerns that mandatory sanctions would chill the 
adversarial process. II See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 
supra. In other words, the "broad discretion in determining 
sanctions was intended as a 'safety valve' to reduce the pressure 
of mandatory sanctions. II Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 
836 F.2d at 877. Nowhere is the Itsafety valve" concern more 
evident than in civil rights cases, where the pressure of 
mandatory sanctions chills the advocacy of civil rights 
attorneys. 
"As a matter of empirical analysis, however, it may be next 
to impossible to assess the full extent of the chilling effect, 
if any, created by the rule." See Note, Insuring 11 Sanctions, 
88 Mich.L.Rev. at 382 n. 240 (citations therein). Nonetheless, 
the NBA members who disproportionately handle civil rights cases 
can unequivocally attest to the chilling effect of sanctions in 
their practice. Further, where Rule 11 is used to curb 
litigation abuses in civil cases in general, there is usually a 
profit concern motivating the lawsuit. Where, however, 
litigation abuse is being curbed by Rule 11 sanctions in civil 
rights cases there is seldom the backdrop of profit motivating 
the filing of the suit. The distinction is important because it 
helps to illuminate the logic of how sanctions would chill an 
area of law practice where profit is not the primary motivation 
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for bringing the suit. The result could drive these members out 
of the field of civil rights law altogether. What a paradoxl 
The "resort to the courts to seek vindication of 
constitutional right·s is a different matter from the oppressive, 
malicious, or avaricious use of the legal process for purely 
private gain. tt N .A.A. C. P. v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 443 (1962). 
Monetary sanctions chill the adversarial process in civil rights 
cases because "lawsuits attacking racial discrimination, [ ] are 
neither very profitable nor very popular. It Id. As recognized by 
the u.s. Supreme Court, the problem that civil rights clients 
face is the "apparent dearth of lawyers who are willing to 
undertake such litigation. II Id. The reason for the lack of 
attorneys who practice civil rights is clear: "lawsuits 
attacking racial discrimination, [ ] are neither very profitable 
nor very popular." Id. II They are not an object of general 
competi tion among [ ] lawyers. t. Id. 
Particularly in civil rights cases, judges should be 
encouraged to utilize innovative approaches as a preferred 
deterrence to monetary sanctions in light of the dearth of 
attorneys who choose to practice civil rights law and the 
unprofitabilty of practicing civil rights law. District court 
judges should, particularly in civil rights cases, consider a 
"wide range of alternative possible sanctions for violations of 
the rule II and the court' s I. choice of deterrence [should be 
deemed] appropriate when it is the minimum that will serve to 
adequately deter the undesirable behavior." Doering v. Union 
County Board of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3rd Cir. 1988). 
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To date, district court judges implementing Rule 11 have 
resorted to a variety of nonmonetary sanctions, including 
reprimanding attorneys, ~, ~, In re Curl, 803 F.2d 1004 (9th 
Cir. 1986) ("[T]he public admonishment of this opinion is 
sufficient sanction U), striking pleadings or papers, ~, ~, 
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d at 878 (U[D]istrict 
courts may theoretically still dismiss baseless claims or 
defenses as sanctions •••• tI), barring attorneys from the 
court, ~, ~, Kendrick v. Zandides, 609 F.Supp. 1162, 1173 
(N.D. Cal. 1985) (ordering attorney to show cause why he should 
not be suspended for practicing in the Northern District of 
California), and referring attorneys to state disciplinary 
"boards, ~, ~, Lepucki v. Van Wor.mer, 765 F.2d 86, 89 (7th 
Cir.) cert. denied, 474 u.s. 827 (1985) (referring attorney to 
state disciplinary body for investigation). 
As stated by the Fifth Circuit, and hereby endorsed by the 
NBA with respect to civil rights cases, tithe basic principle 
governing the choice of sanctions is that the least severe 
sanction adequate to serve the purpose should be imposed." 
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d at 878; ~ also 
Boazman v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 212-13 (5th 
Cir. 1976); Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132, 1136 (4th Cir. 1974); 
Industrial Building Materials Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 
F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1970). The least severe sanction 
adequate to meet the purpose of Rule 11 has been embraced by both 
the Fifth Circuit and the Third Circuit. See Lieb v. Topstone 
Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 158 (3rd Cir. 1986) (UInfluenced 
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by the particular facts of a case, the court may decide that the 
circumstances warrant ~position of only part of the adversary's 
expenses or perhaps only a reprimand[.] In other cases, 
reference to a bar association grievance committee may be 
appropriate"). 
To serve the deterrent purpose behind the rule, particularly 
in civil rights cases, district court judges should carefully 
"choose sanctions that foster the appropriate purpose of the 
rule, depending upon the parties, the violation, and the nature 
of the case." Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d at 
877. 
The NBA suggests that, in civil rights cases, sanctions of 
first resort should be "educational and rehabilitative in 
character and, as such, tailored to the particular wrong." See 
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d at 877. The 
educational effect of sanctions might be enhanced even by 
requiring some form of legal education, ~ Thomas v. Capital 
Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d at 878, or, "[w]hat is appropriate 
may be a warm friendly discussion on the record, a hard-nosed 
reprimand in open court, compulsory legal education, monetary 
sanctions, or other measures appropriate to the circumstances." 
Id. at 878. 
One district court exemplified the type of innovation which 
the NBA subscribes to, in requiring an errant attorney to 
circulate the court's opinion criticizing this conduct through 
his own firm. Heuttiq & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors 
Council, 582 F.Supp. 1519 (N.D.Cal. 1984), aff'd 790 F.2d 1421 
( 
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(9th Cir. 1986); ~ also Schwarzer, 104 F.R.D. 181, 201-02 
(1985) (judges cautioned not to violate Rule 11; the sting of 
public criticism delivered from the bench, while potentially 
constructive, can also damage a lawyer's reputation and career). 
As noted by Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, other sanctions that 
could be appropriate in taking the place of monetary awards 
include publication, an order barring an attorney from appearing 
for a period of time, reprimand, dismissal of baseless claims or 
defenses ••• ", or even ordering lithe attorney[] who violated the 
rule to circulate in [his or her] firm a copy of the opinion in 
which the pleadings were criticized. II Doering v. Union County 
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d at 194 (citing Gaiard v. 
Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3rd eire 1987); Golden Eagle 
Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124,. 129 (N.D.Cal. 
1984) rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th eire 1986». 
B. HITlGATION 
In civil rights cases in particular, the NBA proposes that 
courts consider as instructive the mitigating factors articulated 
by Judge A. Leon Higginbothom in the context of Rule 11; these 
considerations should also be relevant to the extent of any 
monetary award: 
(1) attorney's history of filing frivolous 
actions or alternatively, his or her 
good reputation, Eastway, 637 F.Supp. at 
573; 
(2) tithe defendant's need for compensation, 





the degree of frivolousness, recognizing 
that cases do lie along a continuum 
rather than neatly falling into either 
the frivolous or non-frivolous category 
and that Congressional intent, in 
promulgating Rule 11 sanctions, was not 
to "chill an attorney's enthusiasm or 
creativity in pursuing factual or legal 
theories," Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 Advisory 
Committee Notes; ~ also, Napier, 855 
F.2d at 1091-1092; Gaiardo, 835 F.2d at 
483-484 (liThe rule seeks to strike a 
balance between the need to curtail 
abuse of the legal system and the need 
to encourage creativity and vitality in 
the law.") 
"whether the frivolousness also 
indicating that a less sophisticated or 
expensive response [by the other party] 
was required," Napier, 855 F.2d at 1094; 
and 
the importance of not discouraging 
particular types of litigating which may 
provide the basis of legislative and 
executive ameliorative actions when the 
courts lack power to act.1I Eastway, 637 
F.Supp. at 575. 
~ Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 
at 197. 
Also, the Seventh Circuit suggests that a court consider 
whether the party seeking fees caused the litigation to be longer 
than necessary, because a duty of mitigation exists for that 
party. Brown v. Federation of State Medical Boards, 830 F.2d 
1429, 1430 (7th eire 1987); cf. Schwarzer, 104 F.R.D. at 198-200 
(in assessing the damage done, the court should consider the 
extent to which it is self-inflicted due to the failure to 
mitigate: If a baseless claim could have been readily disposed 
of by summary procedures, there is perhaps, little justification 
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for a claim for attorney's fees and expenses engendered in length 
and elaborate proceedings in opposition). 
IV • THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
There is a split of opinion among the circuits as to the 
proper standard of review to be applied to Rule 11 decisions by 
district courts. Within the Fifth Circuit, there had existed a 
divergence of opinion as to the proper standard of review of 
district court Rule 11 judgments. For example, in Robinson v. 
National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1987) the 
court used a three-tiered approach: 
In reviewing an order imposing 
sanctions, we must examine the aspect of the 
order that is being reviewed. Findings of 
facts used by the district court to determine 
that Rule 11 has been violated are reviewed 
under the clearly erroneous standard. The 
legal conclusion of the district court that a 
particular set of facts constitutes a 
violation of Rule 11 is reviewed de novo. 
The amount and type of the sanction imposed 
is examined under the abuse of discretion 
standard. 
Id. at 1125-26; But see Davis v. Veslan Enterprises, 765 F.2d 494 
(5th Cir. 1985) (abuse of discretion standard is appropriate). 
In 1988, the Fifth Circuit decided that the "complexity of the 
three-tiered standard creates additional work for district courts 
and additional issues for appeal II and adopted the abuse of 
discretion standard. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836 
F.2d at 883-84. 
The three-tier approach first surfaced in Zaldivar v. City 
of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d at 828; see also Brown v. Federation of 
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State Medical Boards, 830 F.2d at 1434. Other circuits suggest a 
variation of the approach used in Zaldivar v. City of Los 
Anaeles, employing an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing 
the factual reasons for imposing Rule 11 sanction and the amount 
and type of sanctions, while reserving a de nQYQ analysis for 
reviewing the legal sufficiency of a pleading or motion and the 
determination to impose sanctions. See Donaldson v. Clark, 819 
F.2d at 1556; westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d at 1175; Eastway I, 
762 F.2d at 254 n. 7. The D.C. Circuit has even suggested that a 
"wide discretion" is available. See Adams v. Pan American Worla 
Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 32 (D.C. eire 1987) (court refused to 
overturn the district court's denial of sanction stating that "we 
-may overturn [the district court's] ruling only if it abused its 
'wide discretion' to determine whether grounds exist to support 
Rule 11 sanctions.") Once again, NBA reaffirms its position that 
the abuse of discretion standard be applied in reviewing a 
finding of a Rule 11 violation. However, a heightened level of 
scrutiny should be applied in reviewing the choice of sanctions 
to be imposed. 
v. Rule 11 DISCRETION AND CIVIL RIGHTS CASES 
There are two schools of thought regarding the application 
of Rule 11 to civil rights cases: on the one hand, critics argue 
that no special treatment should be given to civil rights 
litigation, and, on the other hand, critics argue that sanctions 
should not chill the advocacy of the practice of civil rights law 
which has help shaped America's history. 
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In Perez v. Velez, 629 F. Supp. 734, 737 (S.D.N.Y 1985), the 
court said: "Our responsibility is to take needed punitive 
action against irresponsible and unprofessional conduct without 
doing damage to the underlying cause of equal rights which the 
attorney has served." Nonetheless, that district court judge 
wrote counsel in these cases cannot be permitted to engage with 
impunity in conduct of egregious professional responsibility 
simply because the frivolous lawsuits they sponsor ,are in the 
sensitive civil rights area. Perez v. Velez, 629 F. Supp. at 737 
("litigation frivolous, even though the underlying litigation 
here concerns the voting rights of minorities and the court is 
particularly mindful of the need not to discourage politically 
powerless minority ~oters from bringing legitimate claims into 
court"). The problem is that where political and fundamental 
rights are sought in the courts, minority lawyers have sometimes 
felt the sting of claims of unprofessional conduct when the 
underlying objective is to deter the aim of the litigation, to 
wit, obtain political and fundamental rights for their clients. 
Some district court judges flatly reject any notion "that 
special treatment of sanctions should be given to attorneys who 
handle unpopular civil rights claims, particularly those 
representing indigent and minority clients. Oliveri v. Thompson, 
803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2nd eire 1986) (all attorneys are to be held 
to the same standards of conduct, no matter who their clients 
are; dilatory practices of civil rights plaintiffs are as 
objectionable as those of defendant) (citing Roadway Express Inc. 
v. piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762 (1980». 
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The NBA does not suggest that civil rights cases should be 
immune from the threat of sanctions for violating Rule 11. 
Rather, the NBA does strongly advocate that civil rights cases be 
treated differently in the type of sanction awarded against civil 
rights litigants. Why? The undesirability of the case. "Civil 
rights attorneys face hardships in their communities because of 
their desire to help the civil rights litigant., and most federal 
judges know this. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 u.S. at 433. 
Oftentimes an attorney's decision to help eradicate 
discrimination is not pleasantly received by the community or his 
contemporaries. Cf. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 
488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th eire 1974). As in Rule 11, "this case can 
have an economic impact on his practice which can be considered 
by the Court. II Id. at 719. Available empirical d.ata suggests 
that Rule 11 does potentially chill the advocacy of civil rights 
law. See,~, Note, Insuring Rule 11 Sanctions, 88 Mich. L. 
Rev. at 382 n. 241 (citing for e.g., Note, Plausible Pleadings: 
Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 630 
(1987) ("Conflicting notions of plausibility, as much as overly 
narrow ones, have a chilling effect on litigation, leading 
prudent lawyers to steer wide of even potential implausibility by 
avoiding filing nonstandard claims"); Rothstein & Wolfe, 
Innovative Attorneys Starting to' Feel Chill From New Rule 11, 
Legal Times, Feb. 23, 1987 at 18:10 (Uattorneys unsure of the 
boundaries of Rule II's sweep many be refusing to take novel or 
risky, but arguably meritorious, cases for fear of being 
personally sanctioned ll by federal judges); see also Thomas v. 
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Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d at 885 ("If abused, Rule 11 
may chill attorneys' [in civil rights cases] enthusiasm and 
stifle the creativity of litigants in pursuing novel factual or 
legal theories ll )). Civil rights cases, in addition, accounting 
for only 7.6% of the civil filings from 1983 to 1985, but 
accounted for 22.2% of the Rule 11 cases during the same period; 
in contrast, contract claims accounted for 35.7% of all cases, 
but only 11.2% of the Rule 11 cases. See Note, Insuring Rule 22 
Sanctions, 88 ~ch. L. Rev. 383 n. 244 (1989) (citing Nelkin, 
Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 -- Some "Chilling 
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 
Geo. L. J. 1313, 1327 1340 (1986); see also Woodrum v. Woodward 
County, Okl., 866 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989); Vairo, Rule 
11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-01 (1988). And, in 
a survey of civil cases in general in the Third Circuit, one 
survey data found that reported decisions are only the "tip of 
the iceberg" with respect to Rule 11. See Third Circuit Task 
Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 in Transition 
59 (1989). 
Another impact of Rule 11 that disproportionately affects 
civil rights cases is that some district court judges interpret 
it to mean that all arguments and subarguments fall within the 
award of sanctions. Civil rights attorneys, however, often are 
called upon to make novel arguments to complement the statistical 
data used to make a colorable claim of discrimination. Further, 
to show intent necessary to prove discrimination it is inevitable 
that the civil rights attorney will not have a solid basis in 
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fact until discovery is far along in the process. Or, civil 
rights attorneys may have t6 call for an extension of existing 
law or just the reverse. District court judges must be mindful 
that Rule 11 does not apply to the mere making of a frivolous 
argument. Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 
801 F.2d at 1540. "The rule permits the imposition of sanctions 
only when the "pleading, motion, or other paper" itself is 
frivolous, not when one of the arguments in support of a pleading 
or motion is frivolous. Id. Stated differently, "the fact that 
the court concludes that one argument or sub-argument in support 
of an otherwise valid motion, pleading, or other paper is 
unmeritorious does not warrant a finding that the motion or 
pleading is frivolous or that the Rule has been violated. II Id. 
When mandatory sanctions ride upon close judicial decisions the 
IIdanger of arbitrariness increases and the probability of uniform 
enforcement declines." Id.; See « ~, Zaldivar v. City of Los 
Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986) (we believe a plausible, 
good faith argument can be made by a competent attorney to the 
contrary); see also Davis v. Veslan Enterprises, 765 F.2d at 498 
(tithe district court's determination to impose sanctions may 
depend on whether the pleading, motion, or other paper was based 
on a plausible view of the law.''') (quoting comment to 1983 
amendments); Eastway I, 762 F. 2d at 254 (" [W]here it is patently 
clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success under the 
existing precedents, and where no reasonable argument can be 
advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands, Rule 
11 has been violated." Further, judges must be mindful that the 
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subjective intent of the attorney or litigant is not a basis for 
a Rule 11 violation when a complaint which complies with the 
standard of being "well-grounded in fact and warranted by 
law"), Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d at 832 
(instructions to district court judges in making determinations 
that the second prong of Rule 11 -- "not for improper purposes" 
has been violated). Moreover, the pleading or paper that is the 
subject of the sanction is to be judged by what is known at the 
time the pleading or paper is filed, and not by hindsight. 
VI. THE NIGBTHARE OF THE .APPLICATION OF RULE 11 
TO A CIVIL RIGHTS CASE 
Just recently, the Fourth Circuit overturned a district 
.court decision which involved sanctions imposed on one of this 
country's greatest civil rights advocates -- Julius LeVonne 
Chambers, Executive Director of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. 
See Blue v. U.S. Department of the Army, Slip Ope (NOS. 88-1364, 
et seq.) (4th Cir., September 18, 1990). In this case, the 
plaintiffs accused the u.S. Army with wide-ranging acts of 
discrimination in civil employment including: hiring and 
promotion criteria, pay practices, job assignments, job 
performance, job evaluations, disciplinary actions, reductions in 
workforce, and numerous aspects of on the job treatment. The 
trial proceeded with approximately 38 plaintiffs. The parties 
eventually reached a settlement in which the Army agreed to pay 
all plaintiffs as a group $75,000, and a guarantee that it would 
continue to implement its affirmative action in good faith. The 
court still was to adjudicate claims which it had already heard, 
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as well as all sanctions motions. The court conducted extensive 
sanctions hearings to determine the reasons why plaintiffs had 
abandoned their claims and whether the claims were frivolous. It 
heard several weeks of testimony and argument by the parties. 
The parties then reached a "final agreement" nullifying and 
superseding the earlier settlement. Pursuant to the final 
agreement, the substantive claims of all except two plaintiffs, 
Sandra Blue and Mattiebelle Harris, were dropped. These two 
plaintiffs were not included in settlement because they failed to 
sign the final agreement. However, still before the district 
court were the merits of Blue's tried claims and the government's 
motions for sanctions against Blue, Harris, and their counsel for 
their abandoned claims. The district court ultimately rejected 
Blue's discrimination cla~ as frivolous and, in a near 200-page 
opinion, awarded sanctions totaling approximately $85,000, 
apportioned as follows: $17,000 against Harris, $13,000 against 
Blue, $30,000 against Chambers, $12,000 against Chambers' young 
law associate Geraldine Sumter, $1,414 against a North Carolina 
law firm that had assisted Chambers in the case, and the 
remainder against other attorneys involved in the case in lesser 
capacities. In calculating the amount of sanctions, the district 
court included the salaries of the judge and law clerks as a 
component of the sanction amount. The district court also ruled 
that the NAACP Legal Defense Fund could not be the source for 
satisfying the payment of the sanctioned amount in this case. 
But for the Fourth Circuit's heightened level of scrutiny 
(despite not labeling it as such) of the district court judge's 
-25-
choice of sanctions in Harris v. Marsh, 679 F.Supp. 1204 
(E.D.N.C. 1987), there is no doubt that there would have been a 
chilling effect on civil rights advocacy. As noted by the Fourth 
Circuit, 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that the conduct warranted appropriate 
sanctions. But, for reasons given earlier, we are 
satisfied that the court then failed to exercise 
sufficient selectivity in imposing wider, ongoing 
sanctions than it chose and sufficient selectivity to 
the deterrent effect its decision might create upon 
future Title VII litigants with meritorious claims. In 
our view, this did constitute an abuse of the court's 
discretion which we are obliged to correct in the 
exercise of our reviewing function. 
Blue v. Department of the Army, supra. 
The court's opinion underscores NBA's argument of how 
sanctions can have a chilling impact on civil rights advocacy. 
For example, with respect to the sanctions awarded. against 
Sumter, the Fourth Circuit stated: tlWe are unwilling to see the 
career of a young attorney compromised at its inception because 
she found herself cast virtually alone into a case which a team 
of experienced lawyers would have deemed a daunting one." Id. 
With respect to the $30,000 total amount awarded against the 
plaintiffs, including salaries of the court and its staff, the 
court also underscored the NBA's position that one end result of 
sanctions is that it can deter access to the courts. "Imposing 
the cost of judicial salaries ••• upon litigants is a sort of 'user 
fee' sanction which may operate as an impediment to judicial 
access for those with legitimate claims." Id. 
With respect to sanctions imposed on counsel for opposing 
the sanctions motions, the Fourth Circuit's review found no 
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sanctionable conduct in the attorney's opposition to the 
sanctions motions. Id. The Fourth Circuit also found the 
district court judge's award of sanctions against the plaintiff's 
law firm improper which was based on the fact "that a number of 
other lawyers with the firm participated in this case in varying 
minor ways." Id citing, Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. at 1392. 
! 
Moreover, the court also reversed the district court in its 
I 
indiscriminate choice of sanctions that ordered the NAACP Legal 
i 
Defense Fund not to pay any portion of the Chambers sanction 
award. "However well intehtioned the district court may have 
been, a concern for how th~ Legal Defense Fund allocates its 
monies is not a legitimate I basis in which to order it not to pay 
sanctions. II Id. 
The district court's 9pinion demonstrates how the broad 
discretion qranted district judges in imposing sanctions can have 
I 
far-reaching and highly damaging effects in a civil rights case. 
I 
This case reflects the real-life impact that the district court's 
discretionary authority in limposing sanctions has over the 
survival of the civil rightis attorney and his/her law practice. 
Moreover, this case furtherl exemplifies the need for the Advisory 
Committee to recognize, addpt and strongly advocate the use of 
alternative, nonmonetary sanctions as a method for deterring 
I 
misconduct, particularly in, the area of civil rights cases, and 
I 
\discouraging the use by district court judges of monetary 
I 
sanctions on sole practitioners and small law firms. As one 
well-known civil rights attbrney has confided, "any Rule 11 
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sanction [imposed on him], would force [him] into Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy. " 
VII. INSURANCE AND CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEYS 
Another major concern regarding Rule 11 is its effect on NBA 
members and the issue of their malpractice insurance. The 
uncertainty as to what conduct constitutes a Rule 11 violation 
inevitably prompts attorneys to wonder if they can run for cover 
under their existing professional liability insurance policies. 
Many insurance companies, however, expressly exclude "sanctions" 
from coverage. There are probably many civil rights attorneys 
who carry no malpractice insurance. A 1989 survey of 25 
professional liability policies revealed that 14 have some form 
of an exclusion for "sanctions. 1t See Note - Insuring Rule 11 
Sanctions, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 344, 364 n. 129 (Nov. 1989). What a 
chilling effect. In representing poor clients, the civil rights 
attorney suffers from the absence of prestige in both the 
community and among the legal bar in practicing civil rights law. 
When factoring in the potential exposure of sanctions under Rule 
11, and the absence of insurance coverage, this is to say at the 
very least, chilling. That, coupled with difficulty that many 
sole practitioners and small law firms already face in obtaining 
malpractice insurance and paying its high premiums is driving 
many attorneys away from the practice of civil rights law. 
Further, the liability policies that cover sanctions will no 
'. doubt charge high premiums for attorneys who practice an area of 
, 
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law as civil rights, where there is a high risk of being 
sanctioned under Rule 11. As noted earlier, civil rights cases 
tend to be implicated in Rule 11 sanctions more often than in any 
other types of civil cases. That fact, combined with the 
unprofitability of practicing civil rights law makes for an 
excellent reason to review the effect of Rule 11 sanctions on 
civil rights attorneys. Add the lack of insurance to the 
equation, and the dearth of attorneys who practice civil rights 
law, and the end result is the substantial denial of access to 
the courts to the oppressed and disadvantaged seeking to 
vindicate constitutional rights. It must be remembered that the 
right to counsel is not guaranteed in civil trials. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The deterrent effect of an award of attorney's fees depends 
on the extent of the sanctioned party's resources. In civil 
rights cases, however, the plaintiff is usually poor or are 
persons seeking court-appointed representation. Secondly, The 
deterrent effect of monetary sanctions is de minimis because the 
civil rights litigants, on average, seldom resort to the legal 
process more than once in their lifetime to vindicate a 
constitutional right. In reality, a monetary sanction serves no 
deterrent effect for ,the civil rights litigant. With respect to 
the attorney, courts must be careful not to impose monetary 
sanctions so great that they are punitive or that they might even 
drive the sanctioned party out of practice. See,~, Napier v. 
Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1094 
. " 
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n. 12 (3rd Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Courts must be 
mindful that "other proceedings such as disbarment exist to weed 
out incompetent lawyers; Rule 11 was not entered for that 
purpose, but rather to provide deterrence for abuses of the 
system of litigation in federal district courts." Doering v. 
Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d at 196 n. 4. In 
the long run, the deterrent effect of the rule on attorneys in 
civil rights cases results in chilling the advocacy for persons 
in such areas. There is more utility in educating the civil 
rights client and attorney. 
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